

Term Information

Effective Term Summer 2017
Previous Value Spring 2016

Course Change Information

What change is being proposed? (If more than one, what changes are being proposed?)

To make the course repeatable.

What is the rationale for the proposed change(s)?

The rationale is that the material is sufficiently rich and varied that it can (easily) have (at least) two courses on natural language metaphysics with virtually no overlap.

What are the programmatic implications of the proposed change(s)?

(e.g. program requirements to be added or removed, changes to be made in available resources, effect on other programs that use the course)?

None

Is approval of the request contingent upon the approval of other course or curricular program request? No

Is this a request to withdraw the course? No

General Information

Course Bulletin Listing/Subject Area Linguistics
Fiscal Unit/Academic Org Linguistics - D0566
College/Academic Group Arts and Sciences
Level/Career Graduate, Undergraduate
Course Number/Catalog 5410
Course Title Natural Language Metaphysics
Transcript Abbreviation Nat Lang Metaphys
Course Description Natural languages seem to presuppose that the world is a certain way. In many cases, the presuppositions are philosophically (or scientifically) contentious. We will explore a variety of such cases noting the ramifications for both metaphysics and for semantics. Team-taught course with faculty member in Philosophy.
Semester Credit Hours/Units Fixed: 3

Offering Information

Length Of Course 14 Week, 12 Week, 8 Week, 7 Week, 6 Week, 4 Week
Flexibly Scheduled Course Never
Does any section of this course have a distance education component? No
Grading Basis Letter Grade
Repeatable Yes
Previous Value No
Allow Multiple Enrollments in Term Yes
Max Credit Hours/Units Allowed 6
Max Completions Allowed 2
Course Components Lecture
Grade Roster Component Lecture
Credit Available by Exam No
Admission Condition Course No

Off Campus Never
Campus of Offering Columbus

Prerequisites and Exclusions

Prerequisites/Corequisites Prereq: 5001, or 5401; or Philos 2500 and 6 cr hrs in Philos at or above 3000-level; or Grad standing in Philos; or permission of instructor.
Exclusions No more than 6 credits total are permitted for Philos 5610 and Ling 5410.
[Previous Value](#) Not open to students with credit for Philos 5610.

Cross-Listings

Cross-Listings Cross-listed in Philos 5610.

Subject/CIP Code

Subject/CIP Code 16.0102
Subsidy Level Doctoral Course
Intended Rank Senior, Masters, Doctoral

Requirement/Elective Designation

The course is an elective (for this or other units) or is a service course for other units

Course Details

Course goals or learning objectives/outcomes • Students will become familiar with several themes in contemporary semantics, both in philosophy of language and in linguistics. They will explore the ramifications of successful semantic theories for traditional metaphysical issues.

Content Topic List

- The nature of time, as reflected in metaphysical intuition, semantics, and science.
- The nature of necessity and possibility; the various kinds of necessity and possibility--as these are reflected in semantic proposals.
- The distinction between count terms and mass terms, both in semantics and in "reality".
- The source and resolution of vague terms.
- The nature and reality of events.

Attachments

- Ling5410 Phil 5610 SP16.pdf: Version 2 Syllabus
(Syllabus. Owner: McGory,Julia Tevis)
- Ling5410 Phil 5610 SP15.pdf: Version 1 Syllabus
(Syllabus. Owner: McGory,Julia Tevis)

Comments

- Please make effective term SU17 as it is too late to implement changes for SP17. *(by Vankeerbergen,Bernadette Chantal on 12/16/2016 04:56 PM)*
- Returned to dept. at Julie's request. *(by Heysel,Garett Robert on 12/06/2016 10:42 AM)*

COURSE CHANGE REQUEST
5410 - Status: PENDING

Last Updated: Heysel,Garett Robert
12/18/2016

Workflow Information

Status	User(s)	Date/Time	Step
Submitted	McGory,Julia Tevis	12/05/2016 03:28 PM	Submitted for Approval
Approved	McGory,Julia Tevis	12/05/2016 03:29 PM	Unit Approval
Revision Requested	Heysel,Garett Robert	12/06/2016 10:42 AM	College Approval
Submitted	McGory,Julia Tevis	12/06/2016 10:50 AM	Submitted for Approval
Approved	McGory,Julia Tevis	12/06/2016 10:50 AM	Unit Approval
Approved	Heysel,Garett Robert	12/14/2016 08:28 PM	College Approval
Revision Requested	Vankeerbergen,Bernadette Chantal	12/16/2016 04:56 PM	ASCCAO Approval
Submitted	Heysel,Garett Robert	12/16/2016 05:49 PM	Submitted for Approval
Approved	McGory,Julia Tevis	12/18/2016 12:07 PM	Unit Approval
Approved	Heysel,Garett Robert	12/18/2016 07:22 PM	College Approval
Pending Approval	Nolen,Dawn Vankeerbergen,Bernadette Chantal Hanlin,Deborah Kay Jenkins,Mary Ellen Bigler Hogle,Danielle Nicole	12/18/2016 07:22 PM	ASCCAO Approval

Linguistics 5xxx/Philosophy 5xxx
Natural Language Metaphysics
OSU Spring 2015

Instructors: Craig Roberts (Linguistics)
roberts.21@osu.edu

Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy) Email:
shapiro.4@osu.edu Office hours:

Course description:

Many philosophers of language and metaphysicians make assumptions about what language can tell us about the nature of the world we live in. But this raises the general question of what Emmon Bach (1986) and others have called *natural language metaphysics*: What can the semantics of natural language tell us about the nature of the world itself, which we so effectively navigate with the aid of the linguistic descriptions we share? P. F. Strawson (1959) was interested in what we take to be a closely related issue, which he called *descriptive metaphysics*, pertaining to “the most general features of our conceptual structure”. We take it that *inter alia* he meant to address a question something like the following: Given the independently motivated systematic features of natural language semantics across languages and the structures arguably found over the elements of the domain of an empirically adequate semantic model for natural language, what conclusions can we draw about the corresponding conceptual structures, those involved in conceptualizing the world in which we interact and about which we so effectively share information via our use of language?

In this seminar we’ll look at some specific sub-domains in semantics which are of special interest from the point of view of natural language semantics and descriptive metaphysics. After some general introductory discussion, we will spend time considering relevant aspects of the semantics of number; the semantics of plurals, mass and count; the semantics of events (eventualities) and aktionsarten; the relationships between the mass/count domains and those of the atelic/telic eventualities; the semantics of cardinal numbers; and the semantics of gradability. In the course of this investigation, we’ll spend some time establishing the fundamental results in these domains from the literature in the tradition of compositional, truth conditional semantics in generative grammar. And in each, we’ll then consider how various philosophers and semanticists have attempted to bring the semantic analyses to bear on metaphysical and ontological questions, always grounding these explorations in concrete linguistic data. To the extent possible, we’ll aim to distinguish those conclusions which are warranted from the point of view of descriptive metaphysics from those which are more properly metaphysical *simpliciter*, a distinction which has not always been adequately observed in the literature—either in linguistics (e.g., from enthusiasts of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) or philosophy (various metaphysical claims purported based on linguistic data).

There is another angle on this question to which we will pay particular attention at the outset, and will return to throughout our discussions. Word meaning is often conceived of in sharp terms—wherein the meaning of a word (or word-stem) is assumed to be amenable to clear definition, so that, e.g., the extensions of predicates can be clearly characterized. This was deemed a desideratum of an adequate language for science by the logical positivists and logicians like Russell and Carnap, and it is often implicitly presupposed by semantic theories which base their compositional interpretation of a constituent on the meanings of the words in that constituent and its syntactic structure. But in non-logical—what Waismann (1945) calls *empirical terminology*—this is arguably not an accurate characterization of meaning. Instead, (a) non-logical predicates have what Waismann calls *open texture*, areas at the edges of their applicability where it is indeterminate, just as there is an incompleteness about empirical concepts themselves, so that the corresponding terminology is not always well-defined in the logical sense wherein we can give both necessary and sufficient conditions for its use. And (b) correspondingly, this is arguably not a defect (as the logicians have had it) but a feature: The lexicon is itself in fact *generative* (Pustejovsky 1995), in that it is designed so that existent terminology can be extended in regular ways to address new semantic requirements, both by type-shifting and by semantic extension, both in nonce usages and in semantic change.

Course Requirements:

Each student is responsible to read all assigned papers *prior* to the class meeting on which it is discussed. In addition, by noon of the day before each meeting, each student must post a question or comment on Carmen for each of the papers marked with a *, to be discussed in class that day.

Each student will also write one commentary paper, one short response to another student's commentary, and a term paper. For the commentary paper, each will select one of the course readings, in consultation with the instructors, and prepare a 5-10pp. critical commentary (e.g., taking issue with, supporting, extending, and/or comparing with other relevant work). The commentary will be posted on the Carmen site a few days before each meeting. Another student, preferably across fields (linguist commenting on philosopher, philosopher on linguist), will be assigned to prepare a 2-3 pp. response to the commentary. Both a brief outline of the commentary and the response will usually be presented in the last portion of the class for which the reading is assigned.

In addition, each student will write a substantial term paper. It may be based in part on the commentary, but needn't be, so long as it bears on the theme of the seminar. Each student will meet with the two instructors in a group meeting scheduled during the first part of the term to discuss possible topics.

Academic Misconduct

It is the responsibility of the Committee on Academic Misconduct to investigate or establish procedures for the investigation of all reported cases of student academic misconduct. The term

“academic misconduct” includes all forms of student academic misconduct wherever committed; illustrated by, but not limited to, cases of plagiarism and dishonest practices in connection with examinations. Instructors shall report all instances of alleged academic misconduct to the committee (Faculty Rule 3335-5-487). For additional information, see the Code of Student Conduct <http://studentlife.osu.edu/csc/>.

Disability Services

Students with disabilities (including mental health, chronic or temporary medical conditions) that have been certified by the Office of Student Life Disability Services will be appropriately accommodated and should inform the instructor as soon as possible of their needs. The Office of Student Life Disability Services is located in 098 Baker Hall, 113 W. 12th Avenue; telephone 614- 292-3307, slds@osu.edu; slds.osu.edu.

Course Schedule:

Subject to revision. Full references for assigned readings are given in the bibliography.

1/14: Open Texture

Readings: Waismann (1945), Waismann (1949-53)

1/21: Natural Language Metaphysics

Readings: Bach (1986a)*, Pelletier (2011)*

1/28: Lattice structures for plurals and mass terms

Reading: Link (1983)*

2/4: Events and aktionsarten

Readings: Davidson (1967)*, (1970), (1977); Dowty (1987)*

2/11: Eventualities and Time

Readings: Bach (1986b)*; McTaggart (1908)*, Zwarts (2005)

2/18: Cardinals

Readings: Frege (1980) *Grundlagen* §§46, 55-83*; Hodes (1984)*

2/25: Cardinals, cont'd

Readings: *Hofweber (2005), *Geurts (2006), Moltmann (2011)

3/4: Possible visit by Pelletier

Readings: *Pelletier (1975); Quine (1960) §20

3/6-7: Workshop on the semantics of Cardinals, The Ohio Union

3/18: Natural Language Ontology

Readings: Quine (1948)*, Moltmann (2013)*

3/25: Vagueness

Readings: Edgington (1997)*, Shapiro (2003)*, Sorensen (2013), Hyde (2011), Fine (1975), Machina (1976), Shapiro (2011)

- 4/1: Degrees and Gradability
Kennedy & McNally (2005)*, von Stechow (2008), Morzycki (2013)
- 4/8: Measurement theory, Degrees, and Vagueness Sassoon
(2010)*
- 4/15: Measurement theory, Degrees, and Vagueness, cont'd
Sassoon (2010)* (continued), Lasersohn (1999), Sauerland & Stateva (2007)*
**Note that we will have to reschedule this last meeting, to avoid conflict with Passover.

Bibliography:

All readings are available on the Carmen website for Phil8600.

- Bach, Emmon (1986) Natural language metaphysics. In R. Barcan Marcus et al. (eds.) *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* VII. Elsevier, 573-595.
- Bach, Emmon (1986b) The Algebra of Events. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 9:5--16.
- Davidson, Donald (1967) The logical form of action sentences. In N. Rescher (ed.), *The Logic of Decision and Action*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 81–120.
- Davidson, Donald (1970) Mental events. In Lawrence Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.) *Experience and Theory*, London: Duckworth.
- Davidson, Donald (1977) The method of truth in metaphysics. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* II:244-254.
- Dowty, David (1987) Aspect and aktionsart. Ms., OSU.
- Edgington, Dorothy (1997) Vagueness by degrees. In R. Keefe & P. Smith (eds.) *Vagueness: A reader*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 294-316.
- Fine, Kit (1975) Vagueness, truth and logic. *Synthese* 30.3/4:265-300.
- Frege, Gottlob (1950) *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, translation of J. L. Austin of *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* of 1884. Harper 2nd Revised Edition of 1980, New York.
- Geurts, Bart (2006) Take “five”: The meaning and use of a number word. In Svetlana Vogeleer & Liliane Tasmowski (eds.) *Non-definiteness and plurality*. Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 311-329.
- Hodes, Harold T. (1984) Logicism and the ontological commitments of arithmetic. *The Journal of Philosophy* 81,3:123-149.
- Hofweber, Thomas (2005) Number determiners, numbers, and arithmetic. *The Philosophical Review* 114.2:179-225.
- Hyde, Dominic (2011) Sorites paradox. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- Kennedy, Christopher & Louise McNally (2005) Scale structure, degree modification, and the semantics of gradable predicates. *Language* 81.2:345-381.
- Lasersohn, Peter (1999) Pragmatic halos. *Language* 75.3:522-551.
- Link, Godehard (1983) The Logical Analysis of Plurals and Mass Terms: A Lattice-theoretical approach. In Rainer Bauerle, Christoph Schwarze, and Arnim von Stechow (eds.), *Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of Language*. de Gruyter, Berlin.
- Machina, Kenton F. (1976) Truth, belief, and vagueness. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 5.1:4778.

- McTaggart, J. Ellis (1908) The unreality of time. *Mind* 17.68:457-474.
- Moltmann, Friederike (2011) Reference to numbers in natural language. *Philosophical Studies* 162.3:499-536.
- Moltmann, Friederike (2013) the semantics of existence. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 36:31-63.
- Morzycki, Marcin (2013) *Modification*, Chapter 3: “Vagueness, Degrees, and Gradable Predicates”. Ms. for Cambridge University Press’s series *Key Topics in Semantics and Pragmatics*.
- Pelletier, F. Jeffry (1975) Non-singular reference: Some preliminaries. *Philosophia* 5.4:451-465.
- Pelletier, Jeffry (2011) Descriptive metaphysics, natural language metaphysics, Sapir-Whorf, and all that stuff: Evidence from the mass-count distinction. *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication*. Vol.6: *Formal Semantics and Pragmatics*, DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v6i0.1570. pp.1-46.
- Quine, Willard V.O. (1948) On what there is. *Review of Metaphysics* 2:21-38.
- Quine, Willard V.O. (1960) *Word and Object*. MIT Press.
- Sassoon, Galit (2010) Measurement theory in linguistics. *Synthese* 174:151-180.
- Sassoon, Galit W. (2013) *Vagueness, Gradability and Typicality*. Brill.
- Sauerland, Uli & Penka Stateva (2007) Scalar vs. Epistemic Vagueness: Evidence from approximators. *Proceedings of SALT 17*.
- Shapiro, Stewart (2003) Vagueness and conversation. In J.C. Beall & Michael Glanzberg (eds.) *Liars and Heaps*. Oxford University Press, 39-72.
- Shapiro, Stewart (2011) Vagueness and logic: Model theories for indeterminacy. Giuseppina Ronzitti (ed.) *Vagueness, a guide*. Dordrecht, Springer, 55-81.
- Sorensen, Roy (2013) Vagueness. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- von Stechow, Arnim (2008) Topics in degree semantics: 4 lectures. Handout 1: Degrees. Handouts from lectures at the École Normale Supérieure, Paris, September, 2008. Available at <http://www.sfs.uni-tuebingen.de/~astechow/Handouts/index.html>.
- Waismann, Frederick (1945) Verifiability, §II. In D.M. Mackinnon, F. Waismann & W.C. Kneale, Symposium: Verifiability. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, Vol. 19, Analysis and Metaphysics, pp.101-165. §II is pp.119-150. See especially pp.119-129.
- Waismann, Frederick (1949-1953) Analytic-Synthetic. *Analysis*. Part I: 10.2:25-40, 1949. Part II.11.2:25-38, 1950. Part III: 11.3:49-61, 1951. Part IV: 11.6:115-124, 1951. Part V: 13.1:1-14, 1952. Part VI: 13.4:73-89, 1953.
- Zwarts, Joost (2005) Prepositional aspect and the algebra of paths. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 28:739-779.

Linguistics 5410 — Philosophy 5610
Modality and natural language metaphysics
Spring 2016

Meetings: Tuesday evenings, 7 – 9:45, 353 University Hall

Instructors:	Craige Roberts (Linguistics)	Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy)
Office:	118 G Stadium East ¹	350E University Hall
Email:	roberts.21@osu.edu	shapiro.4@osu.edu
Office hours:	Tu 1:30-2:30 & by appt.	Tu Th 2:30-3:30

Course Description:

Modality has to do with possibilities, obligations, and conditional claims, among many other matters. In order to develop systems with the expressive power necessary to capture the content of modal propositions, logicians have developed a variety of modal logics, adding operators for necessity and possibility to variants on the usual propositional and predicate calculus. Standard semantic models for these systems use “possible worlds” to capture how possibilities—‘the way things might be’—can vary from circumstance to circumstance.

English expressions of interest include modal auxiliaries (*would, could, should, might, can, shall, must* and their ilk), adjectives and adverbs (*possible/possibly, necessary/necessarily, plausible/plausibly* and many others), and lexical items with a modal component in their meanings: *purported, supposedly, reportedly, generally*; embedding predicates like *seem, know, believe, imagine, suppose*, etc.; and even superficially simple predicates like *come*. And when we extend our interest to other languages, we find even more challenging cases: languages in which modal statements make no distinction between necessity and possibility; languages with extensive evidential marking on all clauses, indicating the type of evidence on which the claim being proffered with the statement is based.

Linguists interested in formal semantics have borrowed the tools and techniques from modal logic and the use of semantic models with possible worlds to explore the meanings of utterances like the above. From the other direction, the study of how we talk about such matters, using expressions which have a modal component in their meanings, sometimes sheds new light back on classical arguments among logicians about the meanings of modal statements and conditionals, and about the ontological status and nature of possible worlds—and the semantic status of modal propositions.

In this class, we will first offer a brief introduction to modal logic and to the linguistic treatment of modal expressions. We will then concentrate on some puzzles and arguments concerning modal expressions. We do not assume that participants have either a background in philosophical logic or formal semantics, though they should have some background in either philosophy or linguistics, and at least some familiarity with basic symbolic logic.

The course has two major goals: First, we aim to tease out how assumptions about natural language modality are used—explicitly or implicitly—by logicians and philosophers to argue for particular positions in the relevant debates. Then, we plan to explore the extent to which supporting ontological claims by

¹ Enter through the door between Gates 22 and 24, come up to the first floor (above ground), and follow the map.

appeal to the use and interpretation of modality in natural language involves reasonable assumptions: To what extent does the way we *talk about* the way things are (or might be) reflect the way they really are? In any case, we expect that this exploration will help us learn to avoid the pitfalls of shallow assumptions concerning what language tells us about the world in which speakers (presumably!) exist.

Note that we'll be having an exciting workshop associated with the course on 3/23-24, the week after spring break. See: <http://u.osu.edu/modw2016/> for details.

Tentative Schedule

Readings (full citations below) are to be read prior to the class on which they'll be discussed.

Week	Date	Topics	Readings	Other
Week 1	1/12	Modal Logic I	Portner, Ch..2	
Week 2	1/19	Modal Logic II	Portner Ch. 2	
Week 3	1/26	Kratzer's Semantics I	Kratzer 1977 Portner §3.1	
Week 4	2/2	Kratzer's Semantics II	Kratzer 1981 Matthewson	Commentary on Matthewson
Week 5	2/9	Possible Worlds I	Lewis 1973, Ch. 4 Lewis 1986, Ch 1,3-4	Commentary on Lewis 1986, Ch.1
Week 6	2/16	Possible Worlds II	Kripke 1972 Stalnaker 2003: Intro, 1, 3	Commentary on Stalnaker, Ch.1
Week 7	2/23	Domain Restriction & Modal subordination	Roberts 1989 or 2015 § from Stalnaker 2014	suggested: Kratzer 1986
Week 8	3/1	Two Kinds of Modals I	Portner §4.1 Hacquard	Commentary on Hacquard
Week 9	3/8	Two Kinds of Modals II	von Fintel & Iatridou	Commentary on von Fintel & Iatridou
SPRING BREAK: MON. 3/14–FRI. 3/18				
Week 10	3/22	Circumstantial modality I: Mathematical construction & Potential Infinity	TBA	Workshop on NLM & Modality: W, R 3/23-24
Week 11	3/29	Circumstantial modality II: Metaphysical modality	TBA	
Week 12	4/5	Epistemic modality I: Evidentiality & strength	Portner §4.2 von Fintel & Gillies	Commentary on von Fintel & Gillies
Week 13	4/12	Epistemic modality II: Subjectivity & Relativism	Egan et al. MacFarlane Roberts § on Egan	Draft of term paper due Commentary on Egan et al.
Week 14	4/19	Epistemic modality III: Belief & (dis)agreement	Yalcin Stalnaker 2014 ch.6 Roberts 2015b	Commentary on Yalcin
Finals (Weds. 4/27 – Tues. 5/3)				Term paper due Mon. 5/2

Requirements

Requirements for the course include (1) daily comments/questions on assigned readings, to be posted on Carmen by 4pm the day of class; (2) one or two short essays, on topics to be assigned, (2) a commentary paper on some of the reading and/or a response to another student's commentary, and (3) a draft of a substantial term paper, (4) a substantial term paper.

Philosophy graduate students have the option to petition for this course to count as a seminar, upon completion of seminar-level work.

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Readings

Additional references will be suggested throughout the course.

Egan, Andy, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson (2005) Epistemic modals in context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (eds.) *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth*. Oxford University Press, 131-170.

Egan, Andy & Brian Weatherson (eds.) (2011) *Epistemic modality*. Oxford University Press.

von Stechow, Kai & Anthony S. Gillies (2010) *Must. . .stay. . .strong!* *Natural Language Semantics* 18:351-383.

von Stechow, Kai & Sabine Iatridou (2008) How to say *ought* in foreign: The composition of weak necessity modals. In J. Guéron & J. Lecarme (eds.) *Time and Modality*. Springer, 115-141.

Hacquard, Valentine (2013) On the grammatical category of modality. In M. Aloni, M. Franke & F. Roelofsen (eds.) *Proceedings of the 19th Amsterdam Colloquium*.

Kratzer, Angelika (1977) What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1:337-355.

Kratzer, Angelika (1981) The notional category of modality. In H. J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser (eds) *Words,*

- Worlds and Contexts*. de Gruyter, Berlin, pp.38-74. Revised in Kratzer (2012) *Modals and Conditionals*. Oxford University Press.
- Kratzer, Angelika (1986) Conditionals. In A. M. Farley, P. Farley & K. E. McCollough (eds.) *Papers from the Parasession on Pragmatics and Grammatical Theory*. Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society, 115-35.
- Kripke, Saul (1972) *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press.
- Lewis, David (1973) *Counterfactuals*, Blackwell.
- Lewis, David (1986) *On the plurality of worlds*, Oxford University Press.
- MacFarlane, John (2011) Epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive. In Egan & Weatherson (eds.) (2011).
- Matthewson, Lisa (2010) Cross-linguistic Variation in Modality Systems: The Role of Mood. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 3, Article 9, 1-74.
- Moss, Sarah (2015) On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 8.5:1-81.
- Portner, Paul (2009) *Modality*. Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
- Roberts, Craige (1989) Modal Subordination and Pronominal Anaphora in Discourse. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12.6:683-721. Reprinted in Javier Gutierrez-Rexach (ed.) *Semantics: Critical concepts in linguistics*, Routledge, 2003.
- Roberts, Craige (2015) Modal Subordination: *It would eat you first!* Submitted to Lisa Matthewson, Cécile Meier, Hotze Rullmann & Thomas Ede Zimmermann (eds.) *Companion to Semantics*. Wiley.
- Roberts, Craige (2015b) Agreement and assessment: Epistemic modal statements and the Question Under Discussion. Ms. OSU.
- Stalnaker, Robert (2003) *Ways a world might be*, Oxford University Press.
- Stalnaker, Robert (2014) *Context*. Oxford University Press.
- Yalcin, Seth (2007) Epistemic modals. *Mind* 116:983-1026.